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Costs and benefits to phasing out paper currency 
By Kenneth Rogoff
1, Harvard University 
 
This paper explores the costs and benefits to phasing out paper currency, 
beginning with large-denomination notes, later extending to all but small coins and bills, 
and eventually those as well. It is hardly a simple issue; paper currency is deeply 
ingrained in the public’s image of government and country, and any attempt to change 
long-standing monetary conventions raises a host of complex issues. The symbolic value 
of the euro, for example, as a flag for nascent European Institutions, is hard to overstate.  
Nevertheless, it is important to ask whether currency in paper form has outlived its 
usefulness.   Credit and debit cards today are increasingly being used for even small 
transactions. And although today’s crypto-currencies fall far short of being true 
currencies – for one thing their prices are simply too volatile – the underlying 
technologies may ultimately strengthen the menu of electronic payments options.
2 
Zero-interest negotiable bonds as an obstacle to negative policy interest rates 
1 An earlier draft of this paper formed the basis for a dinner speech at the April 11, 2014, NBER 
Macroeconomics Conference in Cambridge MA.  The author is grateful to Ruth Judson and Stephanie Lo 
as well as to NBER conference participants for extremely helpful comments, and to Madhusudan Vijay and 
Diana Zhu for research assistance. 
 
2 The public may use the terms “currency” and “money” interchangeably, but economists do not. Modern 
central banks typically report several constructs of money, ranging from a narrow one that includes only 
currency and (electronic) bank reserves at the central bank, to increasingly broad ones that include, for 
example, transactions deposits at financial institutions (e.g., checking accounts), time deposits, and 
holdings of shares at money market mutual funds.  Currency in the US accounts for roughly 10% of the 
Federal Reserve’s main monetary aggregate, M2.   
                                                             
1Paper currency has two very distinct properties that should draw our attention.  
First, it is precisely the existence of paper currency that makes it difficult for central 
banks to take policy interest rates much below zero, a limitation that seems to have 
become increasingly relevant during this century.  As Blanchard et al. (2010) point out, 
today’s environment of low and stable inflation rates has drastically pushed down the 
general level of interest rates.  The low overall level, combined with the zero bound, 
means that central banks cannot cut interest rates nearly as much as they might like in 
response to large deflationary shocks.  
  If all central bank liabilities were electronic, paying a negative interest on 
reserves (basically charging a fee) would be trivial. But as long as central banks stand 
ready to convert electronic deposits to zero-interest paper currency in unlimited amounts, 
it suddenly becomes very hard to push interest rates below levels of, say, -0.25 to -0.50 
percent, certainly not on a sustained basis.  Hoarding cash may be inconvenient and risky, 
but if rates become too negative, it becomes worth it.
3 
In a series of insightful papers, Willem Buiter (2009 and citations therein) has 
discussed whether it might be possible to find devices for paying negative interest rates 
on currency.
4  Buiter notes that there were experiments with stamp taxes during the Great 
Depression (currency would remain valid only if it were regularly stamped to reflect tax 
payment). There are a variety of other ideas. For example, Mankiw (2009) points out that 
the central bank could effectively tax currency by holding lotteries based on serial 
numbers, and making the “winners” worthless.   
3 Of course, central banks can and do impose required reserves at sub-market interest rates as a 
tax on banks.  The problem is when the implied interest rates for depositors turn negative. 
 
4 Buiter (2009) credits Gesell (1916) as the first to moot the idea of taxing currency. 
                                                             
2  Paying a negative interest rate on currency, or on electronic reserves at the central 
bank, may seem barbaric to some.  But it is arguably no more barbaric than inflation, 
which similarly reduces the real purchasing power of currency.  The idea of raising target 
inflation to reduce the likelihood of hitting the zero bound is indeed an alternative 
approach.  Blanchard et al. point out that if central banks permanently raised their target 
inflation rates from 2% to 4%, it would leave them scope to make deeper cuts to real 
interest rates in severe downturns. Arguably, paying negative interest rates is a better 
approach if, as many believe, inflation becomes more unstable as the general level of 
inflation rises.  Robert Hall (1983) argues forcefully that the central role of monetary 
policy should be to provide a stable unit of account, and in principle the ability to pay 
negative interest rates facilitates its ability to achieve this in today’s low inflation 
environment (Hall, 2002, 2012).  
  Even if there is a good case for allowing the central bank to pay a significant 
negative interest rate to fight a large deflationary shock, what is to stop a government 
from using negative interest rates as a wealth tax in normal times?  This is a complex 
issue that parallels many of the problems in trying to design central bank institutions that 
will resist the temptation to inflate.  Nevertheless, the challenges of conducting monetary 
policy at the zero bound force consideration of  alternatives to the status quo.  If, as 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) conjecture, business and financial cycles in the 21
st century 
may produce larger fluctuations than they did in the last part of the 20
th century, the issue 
of hitting the zero bound may indeed remain a recurrent one. 
 
Anonymous money as a vehicle for facilitating tax evasion and illegal activity 
3  We now turn to a second drawback to paper currency.  Paper currency facilitates 
making transactions anonymous, helping conceal activities from the government in a way 
that might help agents avoid laws, regulations and taxes. This is a big difference from 
most forms of electronic money that, in principle, can be traced by the government.  (We 
discuss the issue of substitute anonymous transactions vehicles such as Bitcoin, later on.)   
Standard monetary theory (e.g., Kiyotaki and Wright 1989) suggests that an 
essential property of money is that neither buyer nor seller requires knowledge of its 
history, giving it a certain form of anonymity.  (A slight caveat is that the identity of the 
buyer might be correlated with the probability of the currency being counterfeit, but until 
now this is a problem that governments have been able to contain.) There is nothing, 
however, in standard theories of money that requires transactions to be anonymous from 
tax- or law-enforcement authorities.  And yet there is a significant body of evidence that a 
large percentage of currency in most countries, generally well over 50%, is used precisely 
to hide transactions.  I have summarized the international evidence in earlier research 
(Rogoff 1998, 2002).   Other than the introduction of the euro, rather little has changed 
except that, if anything, anonymous currencies have continued to grow at a faster rate 
than nominal GDP. 
Given that banks and businesses are typically quite efficient in their cash 
management (as evidenced by several central bank surveys), the most surprising fact 
about currency is the sheer extant amount that most OECD countries have in circulation, 
far in excess of anything that can be traced to legal use in the domestic economy.  Table 1 
gives data on currency by denomination and as a share of GDP for the United States, the 
Eurozone, Japan and Hong Kong. For example, as of March 2013, there was almost 1.3 
4trillion dollars in US currency in circulation, or roughly $4,000 for every man, woman 
and child living in the United States.  Moreover, nearly 78% of the total value is in $100 
bills, meaning more than thirty $100 bills per person.  By contrast, denominations of $10 
and under accounted for less than 4% of the total value of currency in use.  
The size of dollar currency holdings, relative to GDP or per capita, is hardly 
unique. Indeed, in the US the currency supply is 7% of GDP, in the Eurozone 10%, and 
in Japan 18%.  Despite having lower per capita income, the Eurozone also has roughly 
$4,000 in euros for every one of its citizen (valued at the April 2014 euro–dollar 
exchange rate).  The euro has a much greater range of high denominations, so the value is 
not as concentrated in a single denomination as in the United States.  Nevertheless, the 
same basic phenomenon holds, with roughly a third of the value of euro currency held in 
50 euro notes (roughly $70), and another third in 500 euro notes (roughly $700).  Adding 
in 100 and 200 euro notes brings the percent of high-denomination notes close to that of 
the US.  In Japan, the total amount of currency outstanding is similar to that in the United 
States and Europe, despite having a population size only 40% as large. The concentration 
in the highest denomination is even more acute, with 87% of the value of notes being in 
10,000 yen notes, the largest denomination, roughly $100 at April 2014 exchange rates.
5 
It is true that in the case of the US and the euro area, there is fairly convincing 
evidence that a large share is held abroad.  Porter and Judson (1996) use seasonal 
comparisons with Canada and biometric techniques to infer that roughly 70% of US 
currency is held abroad.  It should be noted that Canada is a country that has relatively 
low currency use compared to many other advanced countries. However, the fact that 
5 Rogoff (1998, 2002) looks at a wide range of OECD countries, and indeed the US does not particularly 
stand out as having high per capita GDP currency holdings. 
                                                             
5currency outstanding is comparable to the US in so many other OECD countries, most of 
whose currencies are used only domestically, suggests that perhaps the size of currency 
holdings in the US is similarly quite large; Rogoff (1998) speculates that the ratio of US 
currency held internationally may be closer to 50%.  Of course, as interest rates have 
fallen to near zero in recent years, it is not surprising that the demand for currency in the 
domestic US economy appears to have risen; using similar techniques to her earlier work, 
Judson (2012) estimates around 50% of US dollars are held domestically post financial 
crisis.  Even if foreign holdings of currency are important for a few countries (including 
also Hong Kong and Switzerland), this is not thought to be the case for most OECD 
countries.  The Japanese yen does not appear to be a significant international currency. 
In any event, it is clear that the long-term trend domestic demand for currency in 
the legal economy is dwindling, due in part to advances in cashless payments.
6  As 
already noted, the small number of central bank surveys that have been performed to 
measure domestic use of  currency in the legal economy typically find very low 
percentages, on the order of 10–15% of total extant currency in the case of the United 
States (see also Feige 2012a, b). Cash is used more intensively in some Eurozone 
countries.   Fischer, Kőhler and Seitz (2004) use a wide range of methods to estimate the 
transactions demand for currency within the euro area to be 25–35% of total euro 
currency in circulation.  This estimate is broadly in accord with European Central Bank 
surveys taken after the financial crisis (ECB 2011) that reported holdings and demand for 
euro in the legal domestic economy of roughly 1/3 of total euros outstanding.  Of the 
remainder, Bartzsch, Rősl and Seitz (2011) look at euro notes issued by the Bundesbank 
6 Wang and Wolman (2014) use transaction-level data from a large discount chain to conclude 
that the cash share of retail sales in the United States will decline by 2.54% per year.  
                                                             
6and find that between 40 and 55% are held outside of Eurozone countries.  (It is quite 
possible that the overall level of euro notes held outside the Eurozone is lower, since 
Bundesbank-issued notes are particularly popular, even if in principle all the Eurozone 
central bank notes should be perfect substitutes.) 
Presumably, currency that is not held in the domestic legal economy or in the 
global economy (legal and underground) is mainly held in the domestic underground 
economy.
7  The underground economy includes agents evading taxes, laws and 
regulation.  The size of the underground economy is not known within any precision, 
though estimates for the US are on the order of 7–10% of GDP (e.g., IRS 2012, Feige 
2012).  The IRS estimates that for the benchmark year 2006, the tax gap (tax not paid 
voluntarily) is over $450 billion, with a gap of $385 billion still remaining after tax 
collection efforts. Importantly, this estimate does not include the informal economy (US 
Treasury Inspector General 2013). In Europe, where taxes are higher and regulation is 
often more onerous, most estimates suggest that the size of the underground economy is 
considerably larger than in the US (see Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro 2010). 
Summing up, currency should be becoming technologically obsolete.  However, 
in no small part due to its association with the underground economy, it is not. 
Arguments against phasing out paper currency 
  The arguments for eliminating paper currency are impressive, but there are 
important points on the other side of the equation. The most straightforward is 
seigniorage.  The United States money supply increased by an average of roughly $30 
7 It is possible that survey respondents underreport even those cash holdings that are for completely 
legitimate purposes, for example by individuals who simply do not trust banks.  I am implicitly 
assuming this is the not nearly as important quantitatively as cash holdings used to avoid taxes or to 
engage in illegal activities. 
                                                             
7billion per year from 2002–2007, and averaged roughly $70 billion dollars per year in 
the years immediately following the financial crisis.  The magnitudes are similar in many 
other large advanced countries.  If a phase-out of paper currency were simply met by an 
increased demand for electronic central bank reserves, there would of course be no 
significant loss.  However, precisely because paper currency is anonymous, replacing it 
with non-anonymous electronic money would likely lead to a large shrinkage in demand, 
and Treasuries would have to absorb the loss.  Rogoff (1998) conjectures that this cost 
might be fully compensated if a modest fraction of the underground economy is induced 
to pay taxes, and there are also of course potential gains from reduced law-enforcement 
costs.  It is unclear how easily these activities could substitute into other transactions 
media, but presumably this could be made difficult by restricting other potential 
anonymous transactions vehicles. 
Of course, if the government simply replaced paper currency with electronic 
currency that it could somehow credibly make anonymous, there would be not 
necessarily any long-run shrinkage in demand. The government would continue to garner 
seigniorage revenues from the underground economy and the problem of the zero bound 
on nominal interest rates would be effectively eliminated.  That said, it is far from clear 
that the government can credibly issue a fully anonymous electronic currency and even if 
it could, anonymous electronic fiat money has all the drawbacks of an anonymous paper 
currency in facilitating tax evasion and illegal activity. 
There is also a question of how forcing a more rapid shift to cashless payments 
would affect transactions costs.  Retailers are typically forced to pay a pro-rata fee to 
companies such as MasterCard and Visa for credit card services. But handling paper 
8currency also entails substantial costs to protect against theft and pilferage.  Also, in 
principle, the Federal government could allow individuals to maintain ATMs and debit 
cards at the Federal Reserve, and arguably these could be serviced by private 
subcontractors at lower cost than conventional bank services. 
  Another important argument for maintaining the status quo is that eliminating a 
core symbol of the monetary regime could disrupt common social conventions for using 
money, possibly in unexpected ways.  For example, it could lead to a precipitous decline 
in demand for debt and not just for fiat money. This need not happen.  In his hugely 
influential book on monetary policy, Woodford (2003) shows that central bank 
stabilization policy can work perfectly well in the limit as money’s role in transactions 
goes to zero.  As long as social price-setting convention remains, and as long as the 
central bank can manipulate banks’ reserves to set the price level, monetary stabilization 
policy can still operate with full force.  However, one must be careful that just because a 
similar equilibrium can obtain with or without a significant transactions role for money, it 
does not necessarily mean that private agents will focus on the same equilibrium as they 
would when there exists paper currency.  Yes, the government can help coordinate 
expectations by insisting that taxes are paid in the electronic fiat currency, and that all 
state contracts be denominated in this currency.  But it is important to acknowledge that 
there is a least an outside risk that if the government is too abrupt is abandoning a 
century-old social convention, it will destabilize inflation expectations, introduce a risk 
premium into bond pricing, and generally induce unexpected macroeconomic 
instabilities. 
9  There is also a potential risk to central bank independence.  Even if eliminating 
currency is at least revenue neutral for the government as a whole, the central bank is the 
one that will lose seigniorage revenue.  The Treasury is the one that will correspondingly 
gain through higher tax revenues and lower law-enforcement costs.  Under longstanding 
institutional relationships, the ability to self-finance has put central banks in a privileged 
position.  Although governments typically maintain oversight of central bank budgets, the 
fact that the central bank nominally appears to be a “profit center” considerably 
strengthens its hand in maintaining operational independence.  In recent years, 
quantitative easing has been a massive money maker, but this is not the normal state of 
affairs when currency provision is a key source of revenue.   
  Another argument for maintaining paper currency is that it pays to have a 
diversity of technologies and not to become overly dependent on an electronic grid that 
may one day turn out to be very vulnerable.  Paper currency diversifies the transactions 
system and hardens it against cyber attack, EMP blasts, etc.  This argument, however, 
seems increasingly less relevant because economies are so totally exposed to these 
problems anyway.  With paper currency being so marginalized already in the legal 
economy in many countries, it is hard to see how it could be brought back quickly, 
particularly if ATM machines were compromised at the same time as other electronic 
systems.
8   
  A different type of argument against eliminating currency relates to civil liberties.  
In a world where society’s mores and customs evolve, it is important to tolerate 
experimentation at the fringes.   This is potentially a very important argument, though the 
8 It is true that nearly all disaster-preparedness instructions recommend holding cash, though unless 
individuals are following this advice, there would still need to be a mechanism for distributing 
currency after a catastrophe.   
                                                             
10problem might be mitigated if controls are placed on the government’s use of information 
(as is done say with tax information), and the problem might also be ameliorated if small 
bills continue to circulate.
9 
  Last but not least, if any country attempts to unilaterally reduce the use of its 
currency, there is a risk that another country’s currency would be used within domestic 
borders.  Even if that risk is not great for a country like the United States, there is still the 
loss of revenue from foreign users of currency (many of whom may be engaged in 
underground or illegal activities within their own borders, even if not within US 
borders).
10  Thus, any attempt to eliminate large-denomination currency would ideally be 
taken up in a treaty that included at the very least the major global currencies. 
 
Conclusions 
Paper currency came into prominent worldwide use at the time of World War I, 
and has played a major role in shaping the global history of the last 100 years.  Despite 
huge and ongoing technological advances in electronic transactions technologies, it has 
remained surprisingly durable, even if its major uses seem to be buried in the world 
underground and illegal economy.  With many central banks now near or at the zero 
interest rate bound, there are increasingly strong arguments for exploring how it might be 
phased out of use. True, there are many arguments for not disturbing the status quo, 
9 I am implicitly assuming that if only small bills remain in circulation, the central bank would still 
have the practical capacity to lower interest rates to significantly more negative levels than if large 
bills continue to circulate, since hoarding costs are much greater for any large sum. 
 
10 Obviously, some foreign use of dollar and euro currency is beneficial to the local economies, even if 
a significant share goes to facilitating illegal and underground activities.  Thus, some countries may 
consider it detrimental to their interests to see phasing out of dollar and euro paper currency.  
However, in an era where inflation rates in most countries have fallen radically over the past two 
decades (making local currencies more attractive), the benefits of being able to use dollar and euro 
paper currency in the legal economy has presumably been falling, and will continue to do so. 
                                                             
11ranging from the importance of seigniorage revenues to civil liberties arguments.  Given 
relentless technological advance, embodied in everything from mobile banking to 
crytocurrencies, we may already live in the twilight of the paper currency era anyway,  
Nevertheless, given the role of paper currency (especially large-denomination notes) in 
facilitating tax evasion and illegal activity, and given the persistent and perhaps recurring 
problem of the zero bound on nominal interest rates, it is appropriate to consider the costs 
and benefits to a more proactive strategy for phasing out the use of paper currency. 
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          Table 1 
 





Source: http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/publication-and-research/annual-report/2012/11_Monetary_Stability.pdf (page 50) 
  
Denomination Value (in thousands of euros) Value (% of total currency) Value (% of 2013 GDP)
€ 5 € 8,028,790.8 0.838% 0.084%
€ 10 € 20,115,075.4 2.100% 0.210%
€ 20 € 57,254,121.0 5.978% 0.598%
€ 50 € 335,791,854.3 35.063% 3.507%
€ 100 € 183,322,233.0 19.142% 1.915%
€ 200 € 39,428,190.4 4.117% 0.412%
€ 500 € 289,720,996.0 30.252% 3.026%
Total (banknotes) € 933,661,260.8 97.491% 9.752%
All coins € 24,029,083.2 2.509% 0.251%
Total (incl. coins) € 957,690,344.0 100% 10.003%
EUROPE
Currency in circulation – February 20, 2014
Denomination Value (in billions of HKD) Value (% of total currency) Value (% of 2012 GDP)
HK$10 HK$2.92 0.967% 0.143%
HK$20 HK$11.38 3.773% 0.558%
HK$50 HK$7.00 2.322% 0.344%
HK$100 HK$27.13 8.998% 1.332%
HK$500 HK$74.09 24.574% 3.637%
HK$1,000 HK$169.19 56.115% 8.305%
Total (banknotes) HK$291.70 96.750% 14.319%
All coins HK$9.80 3.250% 0.481%
Total (incl. coins) HK$301.50 100% 14.800%
HONG KONG
Currency in circulation – end 2012
15Source: http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html 
     Table 1 continued 
Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/coin_currcircvalue.htm 
Denomination Value (in 100 millions of yen) Value (% of total currency) Value (% of 2013 GDP)
¥500 ¥1,066 0.118% 0.022%
¥1,000 ¥38,036 4.193% 0.795%
¥2,000 ¥1,995 0.220% 0.042%
¥5,000 ¥29,595 3.262% 0.619%
¥10,000 ¥790,196 87.101% 16.519%
Total (banknotes) ¥861,335 94.942% 18.006%
All coins ¥45,884 5.058% 0.959%
Total (incl. coins) ¥907,220 100% 18.965%
JAPAN
 Currency in circulation – February 2014
Denomination Value (in billions of dollars) Value (% of total currency) Value (% of 2013 GDP)
$1 $10.6 0.885% 0.063%
$2 $2.1 0.175% 0.013%
$5 $12.7 1.060% 0.076%
$10 $18.5 1.544% 0.110%
$20 $155.0 12.935% 0.923%
$50 $74.5 6.217% 0.443%
$100 $924.7 77.168% 5.504%
$500 to $10,000 $0.3 0.025% 0.002%
Total $1,198.3 100% 7.133%
Currency in circulation – December 31, 2013
UNITED STATES
16